Reassessing deterrence: the effectiveness of administrative sanctions across three EU regulatory frameworks

The European Union (EU) legislator is increasingly relying on administrative sanctions in business regulation. These sanctions are regarded as effective tools for encouraging corporate compliance as they leverage specialised enforcement authorities, streamlined procedures, and fewer procedural safeguards to achieve their goals. However, empirical evidence on their deterrent effects remains limited. Existing empirical studies tend to focus on individual regulatory sectors, lacking a comprehensive understanding of the impact of EU corporate administrative fines. This article seeks to address this gap by compiling and reviewing empirical evidence from three EU regulatory sectors: cartel enforcement under competition law, market abuse governed by the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) and Market Abuse Regulation (MAR), and data protection under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Using an integrative literature review, the article not only provides an initial understanding of what drives effective deterrence but also *E.L. Rev. 437 outlines a research agenda for future empirical studies on corporate administrative fines in the EU, fostering a more cohesive perspective across regulatory boundaries.